Sissel v. HHS - U.S. Reply Brief by United States Department of Health and Human Services
Santa Clara Law
Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Litigation Research Projects and Empirical Data
1-1-2011
Sissel v. HHS - U.S. Reply Brief
United States Department of Health and Human Services
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca
Part of the Health Law Commons
This Memorandum is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Projects and Empirical Data at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Litigation by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Automated Citation
United States Department of Health and Human Services, "Sissel v. HHS - U.S. Reply Brief " (2011). Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act Litigation. Paper 283.
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca/283
 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
 
MATT SISSEL, 
 
  Plaintiff, 
   
 v. 
 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, et al., 
 
  Defendants. 
 
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
 
 
 
 
 
Civil Action No. 1:10-cv-01263 (RJL) 
 
DEFENDANTS’ REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
 Dated:  January 18, 2011.   TONY WEST  
                                        Assistant Attorney General    
                                         
       IAN HEATH GERSHENGORN 
       Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
 
RONALD C. MACHEN JR. 
                                        United States Attorney 
 
       SHEILA M. LIEBER 
       Deputy Director, Federal Programs 
       Branch, Civil Division  
   
       SCOTT RISNER (MI Bar No. P70762)  
       Trial Attorney 
        United States Department of Justice 
       Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 
       20 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. 
       Washington, D.C. 20001 
       Telephone: (202) 514-2395 
       Fax: (202) 616-8470 
       Email: scott.risner@usdoj.gov 
  
       Attorney for Defendants 
  
Case 1:10-cv-01263-RJL   Document 27    Filed 01/18/11   Page 1 of 25
ii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iii 
 
INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1 
 
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................2 
 
I. Plaintiff Misunderstands and Misapplies the Legal Standards Applicable 
 to Defendants’ Motion and His Commerce Clause Challenge ................................2 
 
II. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is a Valid Exercise of Congress’s  
 Commerce Power .....................................................................................................4 
 
III. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Valid Under the Necessary and  
Proper Clause .........................................................................................................13 
 
IV. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Independently Justified Under the  
 General Welfare Clause .........................................................................................15 
 
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................19 
 
 
  
Case 1:10-cv-01263-RJL   Document 27    Filed 01/18/11   Page 2 of 25
iii 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
  
Cases 
 
Bob Jones University v. Simon, 
416 U.S. 725 (1974) ............................................................................................................ 1, 17 
 
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 
370 U.S. 294 (1962) .................................................................................................................. 9 
 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 
298 U.S. 238 (1936) ................................................................................................................ 17 
 
Child Labor Tax Case, 
259 U.S. 20 (1922) .................................................................................................................. 17 
 
City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 
417 U.S. 369 (1974) ................................................................................................................ 17 
 
Daniel v. Paul, 
395 U.S. 298 (1969) ................................................................................................................ 13 
 
Gonzales v. Raich, 
545 U.S. 1 (2005) .................................................................................................. 5, 6, 7, 13, 16 
 
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 
379 U.S. 241 (1964) ................................................................................................................ 13 
 
Helvering v. Davis, 
301 U.S. 619 (1937) ................................................................................................................ 18 
 
Hill v. Wallace, 
259 U.S. 44 (1922) .................................................................................................................. 17 
 
Kelo v. City of New London, 
545 U.S. 469 (2005) ................................................................................................................ 13 
 
Knowlton v. Moore, 
178 U.S. 41 (1900) .................................................................................................................. 18 
 
Kohl v. United States, 
91 U.S. 367 (1875) .................................................................................................................. 13 
 
Liberty University v. Geithner, 
Civ. No. 10-15, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2010 WL 4860299 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010) ........ passim 
 
Case 1:10-cv-01263-RJL   Document 27    Filed 01/18/11   Page 3 of 25
iv 
 
License Tax Cases, 
72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462 (1867) .................................................................................................. 18 
 
Littlewolf v. Lujan, 
877 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ................................................................................................ 3 
 
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) ................................................................................................ 14 
 
McCray v. United States, 
195 U.S. 27 (1904) .................................................................................................................. 18 
 
Minor v. United States, 
396 U.S. 87 (1969) .................................................................................................................. 17 
 
Neitzke v. Williams, 
490 U.S. 319 (1989) .............................................................................................................. 1, 2 
 
Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
312 U.S. 359 (1941) ................................................................................................................ 15 
 
Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 
966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992) .................................................................................................. 11 
 
Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 
96 U.S. 1 (1877) ........................................................................................................................ 3 
 
Raich v. Ashcroft, 
352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2005) .................................................................................................. 7 
 
Sabri v. United States, 
541 U.S. 600 (2004) ................................................................................................................ 14 
 
South Dakota v. Dole, 
483 U.S. 203 (1987) ................................................................................................................ 18 
 
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 
301 U.S. 548 (1937) ................................................................................................................ 18 
 
Swift Co. v. United States, 
196 U.S. 375 (1905) .................................................................................................................. 9 
 
Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 
720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) ........................................................................... passim 
 
 
Case 1:10-cv-01263-RJL   Document 27    Filed 01/18/11   Page 4 of 25
v 
 
United  States v. Ambert, 
561 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2009) .............................................................................................. 10 
 
United States v. Butler, 
297 U.S. 1 (1936) .................................................................................................................... 18 
 
United States v. Comstock, 
130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) ...................................................................................................... 13, 15 
 
United States v. Constantine, 
296 U.S. 287 (1935) ................................................................................................................ 17 
 
United States v. Doremus, 
249 U.S. 86 (1919) .................................................................................................................. 18 
 
United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995) ............................................................................................................ 9, 12 
 
United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000) .............................................................................................................. 2, 3 
 
United States v. Olin Corp., 
107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997) .............................................................................................. 11 
 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 
322 U.S. 533 (1944) ................................................................................................................ 10 
 
United States v. Sanchez, 
340 U.S. 42 (1950) ............................................................................................................ 17, 18 
 
Wickard v. Filburn, 
317 U.S. 111 (1942) .................................................................................................... 7, 8, 9, 13 
 
Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 
333 U.S. 138 (1948) ................................................................................................................ 16 
 
Statutes 
 
6 U.S.C. § 443 ............................................................................................................................... 10 
 
16 U.S.C. § 1441 ........................................................................................................................... 10 
 
18 U.S.C. § 228 ............................................................................................................................. 10 
 
30 U.S.C. § 1257 ........................................................................................................................... 11 
 
Case 1:10-cv-01263-RJL   Document 27    Filed 01/18/11   Page 5 of 25
vi 
 
42 U.S.C. § 2210 ........................................................................................................................... 11 
 
42 U.S.C. § 2243 ........................................................................................................................... 11 
 
42 U.S.C. § 2458c ......................................................................................................................... 11 
 
42 U.S.C. § 9601 ........................................................................................................................... 11 
 
42 U.S.C. § 9606 ........................................................................................................................... 11 
 
42 U.S.C. § 9607 ........................................................................................................................... 11 
 
45 U.S.C. § 358 ............................................................................................................................. 11 
 
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) ............................................................................ passim 
 
Legislative Materials 
 
155 Cong. Rec. S13,558 (Dec. 20, 2009) (Sen. Baucus) .............................................................. 15 
 
155 Cong. Rec. S13,751 (Dec. 22, 2009) (Sen. Leahy) ................................................................ 15 
 
156 Cong. Rec. H1824 (Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Slaughter) ............................................................ 15 
 
156 Cong. Rec. H1854 (Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Miller)  ................................................................ 15 
 
Congressional Budget Office, How Many People Lack Health Insurance and For  
 How Long? (May 2003) ...................................................................................................... 8, 11 
 
Congressional Budget Office, Key Issues in Analyzing Major Health Proposals  
(Dec. 2008) ......................................................................................................................... 8, 10 
 
Health Reform in the 21st Century: Insurance Market Reforms: Hearing Before the H.  
 Comm. on Ways and Means, 111th Cong. (Apr. 22, 2009) ...................................................... 5 
 
Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, CBO, to the Hon. Nancy Pelosi,  
 Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, (Mar. 20, 2010) ......................................................16 
 
Case 1:10-cv-01263-RJL   Document 27    Filed 01/18/11   Page 6 of 25
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Plaintiff bases his entire opposition on a flawed understanding of the burden he must 
carry in this case.  Plaintiff believes that, to defeat a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), his arguments need only be “non-frivolous” and based on “a plausible 
legal theory,” because “this is not the time for their adjudication on the merits.”  Pl.’s Opp’n 28.  
But that is incorrect.  Resolving disputes of law is precisely the purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion, and if the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the governing law, the court must dismiss 
the complaint, “without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close 
but ultimately unavailing one.”  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).   
Here, Plaintiff’s legal argument is without merit.  Plaintiff asks this Court to devise 
sweeping new constitutional rules to strike down a provision of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).  The established tests under the Commerce Clause and Necessary 
and Proper Clause defer to Congress’s judgment that a provision regulates matters substantially 
affecting interstate commerce, or is integral to a larger regulation of interstate commerce.  
Plaintiff asks the Court to ignore Congress’s judgment on these matters in favor of his own 
policy views.  As Plaintiff himself recognizes, the minimum coverage provision regulates the 
economic “decision” of how to purchase services in the health care market.  Pl.’s Opp’n 30.  And 
while the well-worn touchstone of congressional taxing power under the General Welfare Clause 
is whether the provision produces revenue, Plaintiff’s brief resorts to the revival of a distinction 
between regulatory and revenue-raising taxes that the Supreme Court used in the 1920’s and that 
it has long since “abandoned.”  Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974).  
Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed, and judgment should be entered for Defendants.1 
                                                          
1 Defendants do not, for purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, intend to pursue the arguments in 
Part II of their opening brief, in which Defendants contended that the Court lacks jurisdiction.  In 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Plaintiff Misunderstands and Misapplies the Legal Standards Applicable to 
Defendants’ Motion and His Commerce Clause Challenge 
 
Defendants’ motion explained that the enactment of the minimum coverage provision 
was well within Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause, and, independently, the 
General Welfare Clause.  In response, Plaintiff submits that courts “are split” on the question, 
which “presents a novel issue for judicial review.”  Pl.’s Opp’n 28-29.  Plaintiff believes that to 
defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he need 
only offer “a plausible legal theory.”  Id. at 28.  He contends that it is sufficient that his 
arguments are “non-frivolous,” because “this is not the time for their adjudication on the merits.”  
Id.  But that is wrong.  Resolving disputes of law is precisely the purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion, and if the plaintiff fails to state a claim under the governing law, the court must dismiss 
the complaint, “without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close 
but ultimately unavailing one.”  Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.  Insofar as Rule 12(b)(6) carries a 
“relatively undemanding standard of review” in requiring that allegations be plausible, Pl.’s 
Opp’n 29, it is with respect to allegations and issues of fact, not law.   
Plaintiff’s misunderstanding of the applicable legal standards extends to his presentation 
of his Commerce Clause challenge.  As another court recognized in granting a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss a similar challenge to the minimum coverage provision, “[t]he burden is on 
Plaintiff[] to make a ‘plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds.’”  
Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, Civ. No. 10-15, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2010 WL 4860299, at *11 (W.D. 
Va. Nov. 30, 2010) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000)).  Thus, in 
accordance with the proper allocation of authority in our democratic system, “federal statutes 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the event the Court denies Defendants’ motion, Defendants reserve the right to challenge the 
factual basis for Plaintiff’s allegations regarding his current and future injuries. 
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enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, especially where, as here, Congress explicitly 
considered constitutional questions.”  Littlewolf v. Lujan, 877 F.2d 1058, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1989); 
see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607. 
In his brief, Plaintiff seeks to disregard, or even invert, the strong presumption that 
legislation adopted by the democratically elected branches of government is constitutional.  He 
does so based on the assertion that the minimum coverage provision is an “unprecedented 
exercise of congressional power” and a “novel issue for judicial review.”  Pls.’ Opp’n 29.  But 
any new law is by definition to some degree novel.  As discussed in Defendants’ motion and 
below, however, clear precursors of the minimum coverage provision can be found in, inter alia, 
federal regulation of health care, of insurance, and of health care insurance specifically.  But 
even if it were otherwise, the novelty of a law does not diminish the presumption of 
constitutionality.  Necessarily, regulation under the Commerce Clause adapts to the changing 
nature of the commerce being regulated.  A century after the framing, for example, the Supreme 
Court explained:  
The powers thus granted are not confined to the instrumentalities of commerce, or 
the postal service known or in use when the Constitution was adopted, but they 
keep pace with the progress [of] the country, and adapt themselves to the new 
developments of time and circumstances.  They extend from the horse with its 
rider to the stage-coach, from the sailing-vessel to the steamboat, from the coach 
and the steamboat to the railroad, and from the railroad to the telegraph, as these 
new agencies are successively brought into use to meet the demands of increasing 
population and wealth.  They were intended for the government of the business to 
which they relate, at all times and under all circumstances. 
 
Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 9 (1877).  While the ACA is in fact 
consistent with prior exercises of authority under the Commerce Clause, the point is that it is the 
job of Congress, not the courts, to determine the appropriate response to an unprecedented 
economic crisis in the health care market that accounts for one-sixth of the American economy.  
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Once Congress has made that determination, be it novel or not, the Court must accord it 
substantial deference. 
 Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot defeat Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion merely by 
demonstrating that he has a “plausible” legal theory, or that the law at issue is in some way 
“unprecedented” or a “novel issue for judicial review.”  When considered under the appropriate 
legal standards, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and 
this case should be dismissed. 
II. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is a Valid Exercise of Congress’s Commerce Power 
 
Congress acted within its broad power under the Commerce Clause in including the 
minimum coverage provision as part of comprehensive health reform legislation.  In the ACA, 
Congress addressed critical problems in the $2.5 trillion interstate health care market and the 
$854 billion private health insurance market that it encompasses.  ACA §§ 1501(a)(2)(B), 
10106(a).  As part of its regulation of these markets, the ACA requires non-exempted individuals 
to obtain a minimum level of health insurance coverage.  Congress expressly found that this 
“requirement regulates activity that is commercial and economic in nature – economic and 
financial decisions about how and when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is 
purchased.”  Id. §§ 1501(a)(2)(A) , 10106(a).  Those who “choos[e] to forgo insurance . . . are 
making an economic decision to try to pay for health care services later, out of pocket, rather 
than now through the purchase of insurance.”  Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 
2d 882, 894 (E.D. Mich. 2010). 
For more than 70 years, the Supreme Court has recognized congressional authority under 
the Commerce Clause to address conduct that substantially affects interstate commerce.  E.g., 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005).  Here, Congress specifically found that economic 
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decisions about how to pay for health care in the aggregate shift tens of billions of dollars in 
health care costs each year, from the uninsured, who frequently are unable to pay for the medical 
services they receive, onto other participants in the health care market.  ACA §§ 1501(a)(2)(F), 
10106(a).  That, as Congress found, is a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  Id. §§ 
1501(a)(1), (2)(F), 10106(a).  It takes no “metaphysical gymnastics,” but rather a straightforward 
application of the long-accepted constitutional standard, to determine that Congress has the 
power to regulate this economic activity.  Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 894; accord Liberty 
Univ., 2010 WL 4860299, at *14-15. 
Any assessment of Plaintiff’s challenge to this regulation must also consider it in context, 
with other key reforms in the ACA that it enables.  As discussed in Defendants’ opening brief, 
Congress determined that the minimum coverage provision is essential to the ACA’s guaranteed 
issue and community rating insurance market reforms, which bar insurance companies from 
refusing to cover, or charging higher premiums to, individuals because of pre-existing medical 
conditions.  ACA § 1201.  Those reforms are intended to regulate interstate markets by 
eliminating practices that unfairly burden consumers and restrict the availability and affordability 
of health insurance and, as a result, health care.  Yet, without the minimum coverage provision, 
Congress determined, these reforms would not work.  Instead, they would amplify incentives of 
individuals to forgo insurance until they become sick or injured.  Id. §§ 1501(a)(2)(I), 10106(a).  
This would result in a smaller insurance risk pool, which would accelerate the current upward 
spiral of health care and health insurance costs.  Health Reform in the 21st Century: Insurance 
Market Reforms: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 111th Cong. 118-19 (Apr. 
22, 2009) (Am. Academy of Actuaries).  Thus, Congress found the minimum coverage provision 
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“essential” to its broader effort through the ACA to increase the availability and affordability of 
health care.  ACA §§ 1501(a)(2)(C), (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), 10106(a).   
In addition, Congress determined that individual decisions to pay for health care services 
out-of-pocket, rather than through insurance, have an aggregate effect of shifting billions of 
dollars in costs to governments, health care providers, insurance companies, and insured 
individuals.  Congress found that, in 2008, the cost of providing uncompensated health care to 
the uninsured – i.e., care not paid for by the patient or a third party – was $43 billion, and that 
health care providers pass on a significant portion of these costs to “private insurers, which pass 
on the cost to families,” increasing premiums paid by families who carry insurance by an average 
of over $1,000 a year.  See id. §§ 1501(a)(2)(F), 10106(a).  Congress found that such individual 
decision-making, when considered against the backdrop of federal laws effectively guaranteeing 
emergency screening and stabilization regardless of ability to pay, not only “increases financial 
risks to households and medical providers” on an individual basis, id. §§ 1501(a)(2)(A), 
10106(a), but also on the whole substantially affects the interstate markets in health care and 
health insurance, id. §§ 1501(a)(2)(E)-(G), 10106(a). 
 Plaintiff’s entire Commerce Clause argument relies on the assertion that the minimum 
coverage provision does not regulate “activity.”  Pl.’s Opp’n 26-32.  This argument disregards 
his participation in the health care market and the teachings of the Supreme Court, which focus 
on whether Congress seeks to regulate interstate commerce, and, if so, what it may do in 
furtherance of that regulation.   
 In Raich, the Supreme Court upheld the application of the Controlled Substances Act to 
the possession of marijuana that was grown at home for personal use.  The Court reversed a court 
of appeals ruling that held that the plaintiffs were outside the scope of the commerce power 
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because they had not entered the marijuana market.  The court of appeals had incorrectly 
reasoned that “[t]he cultivation, possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes and not 
for exchange or distribution is not properly characterized as commercial or economic 
activity.”  Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 2005).  In reversing, the Supreme 
Court found it irrelevant that the plaintiffs were not engaged in commercial activity and that they 
did not buy, sell, or distribute any portion of the marijuana that they possessed.  The regulation 
was proper, the Court held, because “Congress had a rational basis for concluding that leaving 
home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would . . . affect price and market conditions.”  
Raich, 545 U.S. at 19. The failure to regulate such consumption would, in the aggregate, have a 
“substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market for that commodity.”  Id. 
Raich reflected principles established more than half a century earlier in Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), which upheld the federal regulation of wheat that was grown and 
consumed on a family farm as part of a program to control the volume and price of wheat 
moving in interstate commerce.  The Supreme Court sustained that exercise of the commerce 
power even though the wheat at issue was not “sold or intended to be sold,” id. at 119, even 
though the home consumption of wheat by any individual “may be trivial by itself,” id. at 127, 
and even though the regulation “forc[ed] some farmers into the market to buy what they could 
provide for themselves,” id. at 129. 
 Plaintiff seeks to distinguish these cases by asserting that they concerned laws that 
“targeted” activity, whereas the minimum coverage provision constitutes regulation “based 
merely on one’s lawful presence in the country.”  Pl.’s Opp’n 1, 30.  But Plaintiff is not inactive 
in the health care market.  Instead, he readily concedes that he has had health insurance in the 
past, and currently chooses to pay for medical expenses out-of-pocket.  Compl. ¶ 5.  And 
Case 1:10-cv-01263-RJL   Document 27    Filed 01/18/11   Page 13 of 25
8 
 
Plaintiff does not dispute what Congress understood – that participation in the market for health 
care services is virtually universal.  “[N]early everyone will require health care services at some 
point in their lifetimes, and it is not always possible to predict when one will be afflicted by 
illness or injury or require care.”  Liberty Univ., 2010 WL 4860299, at *15; accord Thomas 
More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 894.  Indeed, a substantial majority of those without insurance 
coverage at any point in time in fact move in and out of coverage, and have had coverage at 
some point within the same year.  Congressional Budget Office [CBO], How Many People Lack 
Health Insurance and For How Long?, at 4, 9 (May 2003); see also CBO, 2008 Key Issues in 
Analyzing Major Health Proposals 11 (Dec. 2008) [CBO, Key Issues].  As the court explained in 
Thomas More: 
The plaintiffs have not opted out of the health care services market because, as 
living, breathing beings, who do not oppose medical services on religious 
grounds, they cannot opt out of this market.  As inseparable and integral members 
of the health care services market, plaintiffs have made a choice regarding the 
method of payment for the services they expect to receive.  The government 
makes the apropos analogy of paying by credit card rather than by check.  How 
participants in the health care services market pay for such services has a 
documented impact on interstate commerce.  Obviously, this market reality forms 
the rational basis for Congressional action designed to reduce the number of 
uninsureds. 
 
720 F. Supp. 2d at 894. 
 By contending that he is inactive by virtue of his failure to purchase health insurance, 
Plaintiff focuses on the wrong market and ignores what Congress sought to regulate.  Even if he 
does not currently participate in the insurance market, he indisputably participates in the market 
for health care services.  Nothing required Congress to focus exclusively on the market that 
Plaintiff defines, and nothing barred Congress from focusing on economic conduct in the health 
care market.  Requirements to obtain insurance are not imposed because of participation in the 
insurance market itself; they are imposed because of concerns that individuals or corporations 
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may be unable to meet costs resulting from activities in other markets.  Under Plaintiff’s logic, 
Congress would be constitutionally precluded from applying any insurance requirement to 
anyone who is not already insured, on the theory that such people are not “active” in the 
insurance market – a proposition without support in precedent, practice, or common sense.  
Plaintiff’s  position disregards the “broad principles of economic practicality” that underlie the 
commerce power.  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 571 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); 
see also Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120 (“questions of the power of Congress are not to be decided by 
reference to any formula which would give controlling force to nomenclature such as 
‘production’ and ‘indirect’ and foreclose consideration of the actual effects of the activity in 
question upon interstate commerce.”); Swift Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905) 
(“commerce among the states is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from 
the course of business”); cf. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37 (1962) 
(Congress chose in the Clayton Act to “prescribe[] a pragmatic, factual approach to the definition 
of the relevant market and not a formal, legalistic one”). 
Plaintiff’s attempt to draw an impermeable line separating participation in the health 
market from the maintenance of insurance coverage ignores the fundamental feature of health 
insurance – its function as the principal means of payment for health care services in the United 
States.  Buying insurance reflects a choice of one method of dealing with the cost of potential 
medical expenses, in preference to other options.  That decision is quintessentially economic, and 
within the traditional scope of the Commerce Clause.  As Congress recognized, “decisions about 
how and when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is purchased” are “economic 
and financial” and thus “commercial and economic in nature.”  ACA §§ 1501(a)(2)(A), 
10106(a).  “Regardless of whether one relies on an insurance policy, one’s savings, or the 
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backstop of free or reduced-cost emergency room services, one has made a choice regarding the 
method of payment for health care services one expects to receive.”  Liberty Univ., 2010 WL 
4860299, at *15 (quoting Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 894).  “Far from ‘inactivity,’ by 
choosing to forgo insurance, plaintiffs are making an economic decision to try to pay for health 
care services later, out of pocket, rather than now, through the purchase of insurance.”  Id.; 
accord Thomas More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 893-94.  And, as Congress observed, ACA §§ 
1501(a)(2)(F), 10106(a), that economic choice is often unavailing and leads to uncompensated 
care, the costs of which are borne by others.  Liberty Univ., 2010 WL 4860299, at *14; Thomas 
More, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 894.  These decisions thus have substantial effects on interstate 
commerce, as it is undisputed that uncompensated care for uninsured individuals cost $43 billion 
in 2008.  ACA §§ 1501(a)(2)(F), 10106(a); see also CBO, Key Issues at 114. 
In light of these authorities, the uninsured – whose conduct, in the aggregate, 
substantially affects interstate commerce by shifting the cost of their care to other parties – 
cannot avoid Commerce Clause regulation by characterizing their conduct as a decision to 
remain outside of interstate channels.  The courts, for example, have rejected challenges to the 
Child Support Recovery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 228(a), which affirmatively requires child support 
payments in interstate commerce.  Conduct that substantially affects interstate commerce is 
subject to congressional regulation, even if it may be characterized as a failure to act.  See United 
States v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1210-12 (11th Cir. 2009) (under Commerce and Necessary and 
Proper Clauses Congress may regulate failure to register as a sex offender).  Congress also has 
the power to require private parties to enter into insurance contracts where the failure to do so 
would impose costs on other market participants.2 
                                                          
2 Examples of federal mandates that market participants buy insurance abound.  See, e.g., 6 
U.S.C. § 443(a)(1) (sellers of anti-terrorism technology); 16 U.S.C. § 1441(c)(4) (entities 
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The Congressional authority to protect interstate commerce, both by prohibiting and by 
requiring conduct, is also central to modern environmental regulation.  Under the Superfund Act, 
or CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, et seq., “covered persons,” including property owners (whether 
or not they are engaged in commercial activity), are deemed by the statute to be responsible for 
environmental damage from the release of hazardous substances.  Such persons are subject to 
monetary liability and may be ordered to engage in remediation efforts.  42 U.S.C. §§ 9606-07.  
The statute imposes a strict liability regime.  A current property owner is subject to CERCLA as 
a “covered person,” and may therefore be subject to a remediation order, without any showing 
that he caused the contamination.  42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).  Even a former property owner may be 
subject to CERCLA as a “covered person,” even if he only permitted hazardous waste to leak on 
his property “without any active human participation.”  Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons 
Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845 (4th Cir. 1992).  The property owner’s characterization of his own 
behavior as “active” or “passive” is irrelevant; otherwise, “an owner could insulate himself from 
liability by virtue of his passivity,” defeating the remedial purposes of the Superfund Act.  Id. 
Congress’s authority to enact the Superfund Act – including its authority to regulate behavior 
that a creative defendant could characterize as “passivity” – is well-established, because, in the 
aggregate, releases of hazardous substances have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  
See United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1510-11 (11th Cir. 1997). 
The minimum coverage provision similarly effectuates Congress’s Commerce Clause 
authority.  The ACA regulates a class of individuals who almost certainly have participated, and 
will participate, in the health care market, who have decided to finance that participation in one, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
operating in national marine sanctuary); 30 U.S.C. § 1257(f) (surface coal mining and 
reclamation operators); 42 U.S.C. § 2210(a) (operators of nuclear power plants); 42 U.S.C. § 
2243(d)(1) (uranium enrichment facility operators); 42 U.S.C. § 2458c(b)(2)(A) (aerospace 
vehicle developers); 45 U.S.C. § 358(a) (railroad unemployment insurance). 
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frequently unsuccessful way, and whose economic activities impose substantial costs on other 
participants in that market.  The economic actions of individuals who participate in the health 
care market without insurance have a substantial effect – an undisputed tens billion of dollars in 
costs shifted to other market participants annually – on the larger market for health care services.  
That empowers Congress to regulate. 
 Plaintiff’s reliance on “slippery slope” arguments, see Pl.’s Opp’n 30, ignores the factors 
unique to the health care market that distinguish the exercise of Congress’s commerce power in 
that context.  Plaintiff suggests that, if the minimum coverage provision were deemed 
constitutional, Congress could mandate that “vegetarians purchase and consume meat.”  Id. at 
32.  Putting aside the obvious questions of whether that hypothetical is plausible or implicates 
other constitutional provisions, such a policy, unlike the minimum coverage provision, would not 
merely regulate the method of payment for services that necessarily will be rendered.  Moreover, 
Congress found here that the effects of being uninsured are direct – people who do not have 
insurance incur billions in health care costs for which they do not pay.  Vegetarians will not 
inevitably consume meat, but individuals will inevitably avail themselves of health care services.  
Additionally, vegetarians are not entitled to free meat (or vegetables) from vendors without 
having to pay for those products.  The situation with health care services is quite different, 
because everyone will need them at some point, and no one can predict the extent of that need in 
advance.  Indeed, that is why health insurance exists.  And as a society, we are not prepared to 
have seriously injured or ill people show up at the emergency room and then turn them away 
when they are uninsured and cannot otherwise pay for their care.  Instead, the cost of their care is 
borne by others, causing significant distortion in the health care market.  Congress did not need 
to “pile inference upon inference” to link the regulated activity and interstate commerce.  Lopez, 
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514 U.S. at 567.  The limitations here derive from the unique combination of features that 
characterize the health care market.  The near universal participation in that market, the 
unpredictable risks of incurring enormous medical expenses at unpredictable times, the general 
requirement that hospitals provide emergency care regardless of ability to pay, and the 
prevalence and enormous impact of cost shifting, yield an airtight connection between the 
minimum coverage provision and interstate commerce, a connection replicated in no other 
market. 
III.   The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Valid Under the Necessary and Proper Clause 
 
As explained in Defendants’ opening brief, the minimum coverage provision is also a 
valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Defs.’ Mot. 22-
24.  Indeed, Congress made express findings that the minimum coverage provision is in various 
ways “essential to creating [the] effective health insurance markets” that the ACA’s insurance 
market reforms are intended to achieve.  ACA §§ 1501(a)(2)(H)-(J), 10106(a). 
In response, Plaintiff offers a single paragraph that argues, in sum, that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause adds nothing to Congress’s authority.  Pl.’s Opp’n 31.  But the Clause is an 
enlargement of, rather than a limitation on, the other powers conferred on Congress under Article 
I: “[T]he Necessary and Proper Clause makes clear that the Constitution’s grants of specific 
federal legislative authority are accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are ‘convenient, 
or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’”3  United States v. Comstock, 
                                                          
3 The eminent domain cases illustrate why Plaintiff’s proposed limitation is incompatible with 
the jurisprudence regarding the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Eminent domain is not itself an 
enumerated power.  E.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 511 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).  It is, however, a power that pertains to the United States as sovereign and is thus 
one of the means or “agencies for exerting [the enumerated powers] which are appropriate or 
necessary, and which are not forbidden by the law of its being.”  Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 
367, 372 (1875).  And Congress can exercise the power of eminent domain where necessary and 
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130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (quoting M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413, 418 
(1819)).  So long as Congress does not violate affirmative constitutional limitations, such as the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the Clause affords the power to employ any “means that is 
rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”  Id. at 1956-57 
(citing Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004)). 
The ACA’s reforms are intended to increase the availability and affordability of health 
care and health insurance by, for example, preventing insurance companies from charging more 
or denying coverage based on pre-existing medical conditions.  The law also protects consumers 
from unfair insurance industry practices, for example, by prohibiting insurance companies from 
canceling coverage absent fraud or intentional misrepresentation of material fact.  See ACA § 
1001.  These goals are indisputably within Congress’s commerce power, and Plaintiff does not 
contend otherwise.  Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, the question is therefore whether 
the minimum coverage provision is “reasonably adapted” to further these legitimate ends.  Sabri, 
541 U.S. at 605; M’Culloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 356.  As discussed in Defendants’ opening 
brief, Congress deemed the minimum coverage provision not only reasonably adapted but 
“essential” to achieving the key reforms that it adopted in the ACA because without the 
provision, the limitations that other parts of the Act place on insurance companies would create 
new incentives for healthy individuals to forgo insurance coverage until after they require health 
care, knowing that, because of those other reforms, they could not be denied coverage or charged 
higher rates once their health care needs arise.  Def.’s Mot. 22-24. 
 As set forth in Defendants’ opening brief, Congress in the ACA pursued the same goals – 
health care affordability and availability – that it had previously pursued for decades through 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
proper to effectuate an enumerated power, without regard to whether the property owner is 
engaged in economic activity. 
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legislation such as Medicare, Medicaid, ERISA, COBRA, HIPAA, and numerous other 
measures.  See id. at 20 n.8.  Congress had “sound reasons” for doing so, Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 
1965, and for including the minimum coverage provision as an essential part of its insurance 
market reforms.  Thus, the provision is reasonably adapted in furtherance of a legitimate 
legislative end, and is therefore valid under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
IV. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Independently Justified Under the General 
Welfare Clause 
 
In addition to its authority under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, 
Congress’s passage of the minimum coverage provision is independently justified by its 
authority under the General Welfare Clause.  See Def.’s Mot. 29-33.  Plaintiff’s reasons for why 
the penalty associated with the minimum coverage provision is not a tax are each wrong as a 
matter of law. 
 First, Plaintiff asserts that the minimum coverage provision cannot be considered a “tax” 
because it is referred to as a “penalty” in the ACA.  Pl.’s Opp’n 22-24.  This argument is plainly 
without merit, as the Supreme Court has recognized that, “in passing on the constitutionality of a 
tax law [the Court is] concerned only with its practical operation, not its definition or the precise 
form of descriptive words which may be applied to it.”  Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 
U.S. 359, 363 (1941).4  Indeed, as Plaintiff himself recognizes at page 33 of his brief, whether a 
statutory provision is a tax is not determined by the label assigned to the provision. 
 Second, Plaintiff notes that Congress “expressly relied on its Commerce Clause power, 
and not its taxing power,” as authority for the minimum coverage provision.  Pl.’s Opp’n 22.  
                                                          
4 In fact, before the passage of the ACA, members of Congress repeatedly and explicitly 
defended the minimum coverage provision as an exercise of the taxing power as well as an 
exercise of the commerce power.  See, e.g., 156 Cong. Rec. H1854, H1882 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 
2010) (Rep. Miller); 156 Cong. Rec. H1824, H1826 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Slaughter); 
155 Cong. Rec. S13,751, S13,753 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2009) (Sen. Leahy); 155 Cong. Rec. 
S13,558, S13,581-82 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 2009) (Sen. Baucus).  
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Plaintiff’s assertion rests on a flawed premise, that Congress had an obligation to invoke 
particular authority in enacting the provision, because “[t]he question of the constitutionality of 
action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to 
exercise.”  Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948).  Indeed, it is not surprising 
that Congress would make findings relating to the Commerce Clause, but not the General 
Welfare Clause, in enacting the minimum coverage provision.  The effect of a statute on 
interstate commerce is partly an empirical determination, as to which legislative findings may be 
helpful.  See Raich, 545 U.S. at 21.  Whether the statute furthers the general welfare, by contrast, 
is a policy judgment committed to Congress, as to which findings, particularly in this instance, 
are unnecessary. 
 Third, Plaintiff contends that, in establishing how the minimum coverage provision 
would be enforced, Congress did not rely on “traditional tax enforcement methods.”  Pl.’s Opp’n 
22-25.  But contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, Congress repeatedly treated the minimum coverage 
provision as a tax.  It is in the Internal Revenue Code.5  Its penalty operates as an addition to an 
individual’s income tax liability on his annual tax return, which is calculated by reference to 
income.  It is enforced by the Internal Revenue Service.  And it will raise a projected $4 billion 
annually for general revenues when it is fully in effect.  See Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, 
Director, CBO, to the Hon. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, tbl. 4 at 2 
(Mar. 20, 2010). 
Plaintiff next contends that the minimum coverage provision is regulatory in nature and 
that it thus falls outside Congress’s authority under the General Welfare Clause.  Pl.’s Opp’n 33-
                                                          
5 As noted by the bipartisan Joint Committee on Taxation, the penalty under the minimum 
coverage provision is “assessed through the Code and accounted for as an additional amount of 
Federal tax owed,” JCX-18-10, at 33, pursuant to “IRS authority to assess and collect taxes . . . 
generally provided in subtitle F, ‘Procedure and Administration’ in the Code.”  Id. at 33 n.68. 
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34.  Relying on Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922) and United States v. Constantine, 296 
U.S. 287 (1935), Plaintiff would have this Court return to pre-New Deal case law which turned 
on whether a tax was regulatory or revenue-raising in nature.  But the Supreme Court has long 
since “abandoned” its earlier “distinctions between regulatory and revenue-raising taxes” that it 
used to invalidate child labor laws.  Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 741 n.12; see, e.g., City of 
Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369, 375 (1974) (“[E]ven if the revenue collected 
had been insubstantial, or the revenue purpose only secondary, we would not necessarily treat 
this exaction as anything but a tax.”) (internal citations omitted); Minor v. United States, 396 
U.S. 87, 98 n.13 (1969) (“A statute does not cease to be a valid tax measure because it deters the 
activity taxed, because the revenue obtained is negligible, or because the activity is otherwise 
illegal.”); United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950) (“It is beyond serious question that a 
tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters 
the activities taxed.”). 
Even if the earlier cases cited by Plaintiff had any lingering validity, they would not bring 
the constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision into question.  At most, they suggested 
that a court may invalidate punitive or coercive penalties, and even then, only those penalties that 
coerce the taxpayer into a separate administrative scheme with detailed enforcement mechanisms 
not allowable under the Commerce Clause.  See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 
289 (1936); Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 68-69 (1922); Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 38.  
Here, the minimum coverage provision is neither punitive nor coercive; the maximum penalty is 
no greater than the cost of obtaining insurance.  Moreover, the penalty under the minimum 
coverage provision does not operate coercively to force individuals into a separate regulatory 
regime.  The regulatory effect is from the operation of the provision itself. 
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Finally, Plaintiff argues that the General Welfare Clause cannot authorize the minimum 
coverage provision because the provision is outside the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
authority.  Pl.’s Opp’n 34.  This argument, under which the General Welfare Clause adds nothing 
to Congress’s power, is wrong.  Congress’s power under the General Welfare Clause is 
“extensive.”  License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 (1867); see also Steward Mach. Co. 
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 581 (1937); United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 93 (1919); McCray 
v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56-59 (1904).  And Congress may use its authority under this 
Clause even for purposes beyond its powers under the other provisions of Article I, including the 
Commerce Clause.  See Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44 (“Nor does a tax statute necessarily fall because 
it touches on activities which Congress might not otherwise regulate.”); United States v. Butler, 
297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936).  Plaintiff’s contention that the General Welfare Clause does not authorize 
Congress to act in ways not separately authorized by the Commerce Clause is plainly wrong.  
See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 59-60 (1900) (holding that Congress can tax inheritances, 
even if it cannot regulate them under the Commerce Clause).  To be sure, Congress must use its 
power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 to “provide for the . . . general Welfare.”  But as the 
Supreme Court held 75 years ago with regard to the Social Security Act, decisions of how best to 
provide for the general welfare are for the representative branches, not for the courts.  Helvering 
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640, 645 & n.10 (1937); see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 
(1987).   
 
 
 
 
Case 1:10-cv-01263-RJL   Document 27    Filed 01/18/11   Page 24 of 25
19 
 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, and in Defendants’ motion, the Court should dismiss 
Plaintiff’s complaint. 
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